Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become integrated into the business processes of both government and commercial institutions. Cheap and ubiquitous mobile computing devices represent computing's fifth wave [1] , bringing about new opportunities in the marketplace. MCDs are small, portable, and able to store large amounts of information. The breadth of communication options (infrared, radio frequency, or USB cable) for MCDs introduces many security risks. Some of the problems associated with MCDs are: easy to loose, misplace, or have stolen; potential loss/comprise of company data (user ids, passwords, contacts, digital certificates, sensitive documentation, credit card numbers), increases the opportunity for a backdoor into an enterprise's network, lack of authentication and limited logging capability. The use of these devices poses a risk to the security of an organization. Identifying wireless devices in a given air space is necessary to discover misconfigured devices or security holes or back doors into the corporate network.
Mobile phones are at the greatest risk due to their shear numbers in the marketplace [2] and the convergence of PDA like functionality and cellular technology into a single smart phone device [3] . There are currently more than 2.5 billion cellular connections worldwide [4] . The mobile malware count has already exceeded 200 so far this year [5] .
Patching personal computer (PC) software to mitigate security vulnerabilities or upgrade applications is almost automatic today. However, patching mobile device firmware/software is a more difficult process, typically requiring connectivity with a PC. The likelihood that mobile device owners, who are mostly not security conscious, will perform these upgrades is highly improbable, increasing the possibility of spreading malware.
Information technology departments are allowing employees to procure mobile devices due to their low cost and ability to improve productivity. As such, a company or government entity has little control over corporate data leaving the organization on a mobile device. How the devices are used and the type of information that is stored on the devices will directly impact the overall risk to the organization. Organizations should perform risk assessments and develop security plans for MCDs to understand the value of data stored on these devices and the risk of compromising enterprise networks. MCD vulnerability tracking and research is essential to minimizing this risk.
II. THREATS TO A MOBILE DEVICE
Threat modeling techniques are used to identify and prioritize the threats posed to a MCD. At a high level this process involves identifying the entry points into a device, assets on the device, how the device is used, modeling the system, identifying the threats, and determining if there are valid attack paths for the threats [6] . Some examples of potential threats, and corresponding assets, for smart phones are shown in Table 1 . Some other possible threats include make long distance phone calls, gain access to contact information or meeting notes, connect to corporate systems (via Bluetooth, WiFi, or cradle) and exporting data, and sending email or SMS (Short Message Service) messages unbeknownst to the user. Threats that have valid attack paths are considered vulnerabilities; i.e., the vulnerability is a way of realizing the threat.
Software development kits (SDKs), with source code, are now available for MCDs. The source code provides the software developer with the ability to create distinctive devices, while also opening the door for malicious programmers to introduce additional threats.
III. MOBILE DEVICE VULNERABILITIES
The INL has categorized known vulnerabilities and attacks according to the type of network components and software elements that are susceptible. This provides a proof of principle on how an adversary might be able to exploit identified weaknesses in specific software elements in order to perform undesirable activities. Insecure or rogue wireless devices can compromise the infrastructure of an organization. Understanding the vulnerabilities, and the associated countermeasures, of MCDs is the key to mitigating the threat. The main objective of this effort is to enhance the security of MCDs and make them safer to use in corporate and government environments. Meeting this objective requires understanding the threats, and then providing guidance on how to mitigate those threats. This objective is met by performing vulnerability research and tracking mobile device vulnerabilities. Mobile device research requires an understanding of the continually evolving technologies deployed on MCDs.
A number of computer vulnerability databases are currently accessible over the Internet today. However there is no known equivalent to this in the mobile device world. The INL has developed a Web-based intelligent database application, MDVD (Mobile Device Vulnerability Database), that stores vulnerability and countermeasure information for MCDs. MDVD enables a user to query for technical information on a MCD, which accesses a vulnerability and countermeasure database, and produces a report detailing the known vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Vulnerability and countermeasure information is harvested from the Internet and then entered into MDVD. A variation of MDVD, based on a collaborative database model, will be hosted on the Internet in the near future. This will allow registered users to enter vulnerability and countermeasure data that will reviewed by moderators before being made available to all users.
The approach to understanding the security issues associated with mobile devices involves:
1. Vulnerability discovery, 2.
Vulnerability testing, 3.
Using tools to protect MCDs from vulnerabilities, and 4. Understand threats posed by the wireless landscape.
A. Vulnerability Discovery Viruses and other exploits are possible to develop for computing devices due to flaws, or vulnerabilities, in the software. Vulnerability verification requires the execution of exploits to establish the truth, accuracy, or efficacy of vulnerabilities on specific devices. Vulnerabilities for MCDs are found by:
Searching the Internet for documented vulnerabilities and By first hand discovery using traditional vulnerability discovery techniques applied to mobile devices. 
Searching the Internet for
generally an unstructured format. For example, "BlackBerry flaw highlights growing mobile device risks" is a news story that
B. Vulnerability Testing
The development of exploit code is one of the most difficult programming tasks when verifying computer vulnerabilities. The software may present a common programming error (e.g. buffer overflow), but writing an exploit that exercises that particular portion of the vulnerable software is often tricky. Not all programming errors are easily exploitable. Another challenge in writing exploit code is the hurdle of becoming familiar with unique mobile device architectures. Exploit code is often written in assembly instructions. The instruction set for a device depends upon the processor and available C libraries depend upon the operating system. A vector analysis is performed using the previously discovered vulnerabilities in MDVD. The vector analysis produces attack vectors that represent the sequence of software steps that must be created to develop the exploits. The exploits are then run to verify the vulnerabilities in MDVD; i.e., make sure the vulnerabilities really represent weaknesses in the software that attackers could exploit.
C. Using Tools to Protect Mobile Devices from Vulnerabilities
Protecting business organizations from MCDs with known vulnerabilities requires the ability to detect those devices and automatically identify vulnerabilities. Mobile computing devices continue to gain more capability, in terms of CPU power, data storage, battery life, and high-speed wireless communications. Many applications that run on desktop computers will be migrated to these devices as the capabilities increase. Commercial virus protection, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems provide a first line of defense. Data encryption, password protection, and sensible configuration management will also provide protection against mobile malware.
An INL toolkit is under development that identifies device vulnerabilities and provides an organization with countermeasure information that can be applied to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The toolkit additionally provides defensive software that may be deployed on a mobile device to mitigate the possibility of rogue code using the communications capability of the device to export information. The vulnerability is that communications channels may be subject to unauthorized use on a mobile device.
Mobile devices, like desktop computers, employ a variety of software technologies (see Table 2 ). Any of these technologies may provide potential attack vectors/entry points into a mobile device. For example, vulnerabilities in 802.11b/g, or an unsafe configuration, could enable a malicious user to gain unrestricted access to the device. Mobile device operating system (OS), communication protocol, application, or general software code that uses insecure functions and simply trusts input data makes the software vulnerable to buffer overruns, indexing errors, format string bugs, and Unicode/ANSI buffer size mismatches [11] . However, unlike desktop/laptop/server computers, mobile devices have one owner who is the "administrator" and "user" of the device. Additionally, access control lists, which are an important defensive mechanism for general computers, are non-existent on mobile devices. 
D. Understanding Threats Posed By Wireless Landscape
Understanding the potential methods of attack is important for implementing effective defensive strategies. Mobile devices use wireless communication technologies to connect to other devices and networks. The likelihood of malicious code being deployed on mobile devices will increase as mobile high-speed data networks become pervasive. A key element in safely using MCDs is to understand the threats posed by the wireless landscape, which consists of wireless transceivers used both in businesses and homes. MCDs move between work, home, and elsewhere, potentially making these devices susceptible to malicious code. Misconfigured devices, security holes, and back doors may be identified by collecting and analyzing data from the wireless landscape.
Wireless transceivers may be cell towers, Bluetooth devices/access points, and WiFi devices/access points. Bluetooth technology is deployed in audio headsets, vehicles, mobile devices, printers, vending machines, parking meters, and others. WiFi technology is deployed as local area networks and in many laptop computers and mobile devices. As noted in Table 2 , wireless devices and technologies represent potential vectors into mobile devices. To get an understanding of the wireless landscape, both Bluetooth and WiFi data were gathered in the same geographical area.
The collected Bluetooth data consists of Bluetooth device address, manufacturer, device type, signal strength, pairing and connection status, time, and services available. The Bluetooth services available may include voice gateway, dialup networking, serial port, and file transfer. The Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) is a means for applications to discover which services are available and to determine the characteristics of those available services. The SDP is used by a Bluetooth client device to locate services that are available on or via devices in the client's air space. The WiFi data consists of MAC address, SSID (service set identifier), channel, speed, vendor name, encryption, managed or ad hoc, signal strength, signal to noise ratio (SNR), latitude and longitude, capability information, and beacon interval.
A three dimensional plot of normalized SNR, encryption, and channel WiFi data is shown in Figure 1 . The data depicts the access points that would be easy for malicious users to target; i.e., no encryption and a high SNR. Figure 2 shows a plot of normalized access point manufacturer, encryption, and SNR WiFi data. A malicious person might target devices of a given manufacturer by simply trying the default SSID and password to gain administrative access to the device. An invalid MAC address (no denoted manufacturer) for some host may be an indication that the host is sniffing network traffic. One approach to detecting regularities and correlations in WiFi/Bluetooth discovery data is to group the data into classes or clusters. All of the objects in one cluster are highly similar to one another, and dissimilar to objects in other clusters. The data is represented as input vectors, where each input vector is for some WiFi/Bluetooth access point/device. Each element in a vector represents a WiFi/Bluetooth characteristic. One model-based approach to clustering data is a self-organizing neural network (NN) known as a Kohonen map [12, 13, 14] . Possible uses of the Kohonen map are for exploratory data analysis and novelty detection. As the network learns to recognize clusters of data the user also begins to understand the data and can refine the network and label the classes. Then the network can be used to perform classification of new data. If new data does not fit into the existing model, then these new data objects are called outliers and this indicates novelty. Novel manufacturer types, indicated by the first 6 digits of the MAC address, may represent spoofed MAC addresses.
Wireless landscape data was collected, while driving through a community, on observed wireless access points using both a high-gain directional antenna and a wireless PCMCIA card. WiFi data collection resulted in the discovery of over 800 access points and devices. The data shows that approximately 47% of detected access points have no authentication or encryption. In the wired world, this is analogous to finding Ethernet cables at various community locations that anyone can plug into and gain unrestricted access to the Internet with no authentication. Only 4% of the devices detected represented peer-to-peer connections.
Mobile devices are not highly secure. A number of devices are configured by default (Bluetooth and WiFi) to allow access to other computing resources with minimal security. Devices with Bluetooth technology fully enabled and ready to connect to others have easily been found in public places using a Bluetooth discovery tool such as BlueScanner.
A wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) may help mitigate the threats posed to wireless local area networks (WLAN) and mobile devices via any wireless technology. A WLAN may be subject to TCP/IP and denial of service attacks, MAC address spoofing, and a wide variety of 802.11 specific threats [15] .
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Relatively inexpensive and powerful mobile devices using high-speed mobile data networks via WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular technologies are the future. These devices are used in remote sensing, input [16] , and control applications [17] . Mobile devices are not highly secure and, like desktop computers, need to have defensive software installed for protection. The Dick Tracy watch popularized in 1940s comics may be viable in the not too distant future as highspeed mobile networks become pervasive and mobile devices continue to increase in power and capability (http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Dick+T racy+watch&i=41250,00.asp).
Our future work involves further exploration of vulnerabilities in wireless technologies, developing additional mechanisms to both identify device vulnerabilities and to protect mobile devices from attack, and using mobile devices as remote sensors. Countermeasures may be developed for mobile device vulnerabilities when no commercial software exists.
A long-term goal is to perform semi-automatic collection of mobile device vulnerability data from the Internet and populate the MDVD. Clustering and classification of vulnerability and wireless data will be used in combination with active interrogation of a mobile device, as the device enters some area space, to identify potential threats to enterprise systems. This data will be used to help spot vulnerable devices and as input to a WIDS. The WIDS will use this information to detect both common and unique threats to the wireless landscape using neural networking techniques. Efficient clustering and classification techniques will be explored to gain a deeper understanding of regularities and correlations in mobile devices.
